Violence in Post-Conflict Societies by Anders Themnér

Author:Anders Themnér [Themnér, Anders]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, General, Political Science, Law Enforcement, Peace, Political Freedom
ISBN: 9781136708268
Google: lGSrAgAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2011-05-10T15:53:40+00:00

Remarginalization

Although the arrival of peace entailed a process of economic remarginalization for former CDF fighters, it did not result in their political or physical disempowerment. In fact, after the reinstatement of Kabbah in 1998, SLPP totally dominated the Sierra Leonean political scene. This was to a large degree a result of SLPP’s control of the presidential office, in which a considerable amount of executive power was vested.43 Thanks to the historical ties that existed between Kabbah and the militia, CDF ex-combatants were, politically speaking, well off. SLPP also controlled the other political institutions of the state. Owing to its electoral successes in 1996 and 2002, SLPP dominated the parliaments and governments of 1996–7, 1998–2002 and 2002–7. The political influence of SLPP was also due to the lack of viable opposition parties that could effectively challenge SLPP. The only credible challenger, APC, was internally divided and struggling to overcome its tarnished image from the days of authoritarian rule (ICG 2002c: 7).

What was particularly important for former CDF combatants was that several of their old patrons held key positions in the running of the country. Not only was Kabbah president, but Joe Demby, who had been close to the militia, was vice-president (1996–2002) and Momoh Pujeh, an important CDF financier, was transportation minister (1999–2001) (ICG 2002c: 11). Meanwhile ever since 1996, Norman had held ministerial positions, first as deputy defence minister (1996–2002) and later as minister of internal affairs (2002–3). Of these, it was principally the inclusion of Norman in the government that guaranteed former CDF fighters a certain degree of political sway, as he took an active interest in his former subordinates (interviews with Dumbuya Jah 2006 and Yamba 2006). For example, when CDF ex-combatants were accused of hijacking a NCDDR car in October 2001, Norman went out in the media and denied that his former fighters were to blame. However, to be on the safe side he added that, if, despite everything, they were involved, they must have been provoked by shortcomings in the work of NCDDR.44 The fact that Norman and other former CDF patrons were part of the ruling elite also guaranteed former CDF fighters access to nepotistic channels. The clearest example of this was that the authorities handed out both money and rice to ex-militiamen as late as the summer of 2002, several months after the completion of the demobilization process (ICG 2002c: 11; Tommy and Kabbah 2006). It seems, however, that this type of support was available only to the small minority of CDF ex-fighters who had a more personal relationship with individual SLPP dignitaries (interviews with ex-CDF 2 2006 and Dumbuya 2006).

During the run-up to the national elections in 2002, the political position of the CDF ex-fighters became more precarious as a result of internal power struggles within SLPP. In the fall of 2001, Kabbah’s leadership was challenged by some of the CDF ex-combatants’ most important patrons: Demby, Norman and Pujeh. In retaliation Kabbah sought to marginalize the troublemakers. In November Pujeh was indicted for

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